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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Terry Sutton1 sought to operate an adult entertainment club inside a 
shopping center he owned in Chanceford Township, Pennsylvania.  But the Township’s 
Zoning Hearing Board rejected his application for a permit.  So Sutton sued the 
                                              
+ The Honorable Juan Sánchez, Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 Terry Sutton’s wife, Brenda, and his business partner, Chris Cinkaj, are also 
appellants.  Because they all advance the same claims, we refer only to Terry for ease of 
reference. 
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Township and many of its officials, arguing, among other things, that the Township’s 
special requirements for adult entertainment facilities violate the First Amendment, both 
facially and as applied, and that the Board’s rejection of his application also violated his 
right to substantive due process.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the Township, and, for the following reasons, we will affirm.  
I. 
Because we write solely for the parties, we recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.   
Chanceford Township, like many municipalities, has a zoning ordinance to 
regulate development.  The ordinance divides the Township into five zones, and within 
each one, some uses are generally permitted, some are prohibited, and others are 
permitted by “special exception.”  Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 165–66.2  A use permitted by 
special exception requires a permit from the Zoning Hearing Board.  Before granting any 
application for a special exception, the Board must make several findings, including that 
the applicant has established that the proposed use will comply with certain sewage-
disposal and ground-water recharge requirements.   
One use permitted in the Township’s General Commercial Zone as a special 
exception is an “adult oriented facility.”  J.A. 165.  As such, it must be approved by the 
Zoning Hearing Board, no different from any other use permitted by special exception.  
                                              
2 We note that two consecutive pages in the Joint Appendix are labeled as J.A. 
165.  When citing this page, we refer to the second page labeled J.A. 165, which contains 
a table of permitted and special exception uses.  
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But the ordinance also subjects adult oriented facilities, specifically, to several additional 
requirements:   
 that there be no outward display of any materials or signage related to the 
adult entertainment offered inside; 
 that the facility be windowless or not viewable from the outside;  
 that it contain a notice on every entrance explaining that people under 
eighteen are not permitted and that others may be offended by the 
entertainment;  
 that it have a certain number of parking spaces;  
 that it be at least 1,000 feet “from any public or parochial school offering 
education below the college level, church, library, child day care, or nursery 
school, including church related nursery school”; 
 that, if that 1,000-foot distance “cannot practically be achieved,” the facility 
still must be more than 500 feet from such places, and there must be a six-
foot tall “security fence” around the facility; and 
 that the facility have trees or shrubs around its perimeter “to form an 
effective visual barrier between [it] and any residence, school, recreation 
facility, or other non-commercial or non-industrial use.” 
J.A. 206–07.    
 In March 2013, Terry Sutton applied for a special exception to use part of his 
property as an adult cabaret featuring nude female dancers.  The Zoning Hearing Board 
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held a hearing and then, in a written decision, denied the application.  It first explained 
that, under the zoning ordinance, a shopping center can consist only of “stores,” which 
the cabaret was not.  J.A. 957.  The Board further explained that, regardless, the 
application failed to demonstrate that the proposed use would meet the sewage-disposal 
and ground-water recharge requirements required for any special exception under the 
zoning ordinance.  And finally, the Board explained that the cabaret, because it would 
feature nude dancing while also permitting patrons to bring in their own alcohol, would 
violate state law, which prohibits lewd entertainment in a “bottle club.”  18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 7329.  Because the proposed use would be unlawful, the Board found that it would 
constitute a “nuisance” prohibited under Section 301.1 of the ordinance.  J.A. 961.   
In response, Sutton filed a complaint against Chanceford Township3 in federal 
court, asserting claims under both federal and Pennsylvania law.  Most relevant to this 
appeal, he claimed that the Township’s ordinance violated the First Amendment, both 
facially and as applied, and that the Township, in denying his application, violated his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Township, and Sutton timely appealed.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and the District Court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367.  Our review of a grant of summary 
judgment is de novo.  Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).  
                                              
3 The lawsuit also named various Chanceford officials as defendants.   
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Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the non-movant, “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a)). 
III. 
 Sutton presents three arguments:  that the Township’s ordinance’s restrictions on 
adult entertainment facilities facially violate the First Amendment; that those restrictions 
were unconstitutional as applied here; and that the Board, in rejecting his application, 
violated his right to substantive due process.  None have merit.   
A. 
 We start with the facial challenge.  The Supreme Court has held that “zoning 
ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of [adult] businesses are 
to be reviewed under the standards applicable to ‘content-neutral’ time, place, and 
manner regulations.”  City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986).  
That is, such zoning ordinances are valid when “they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant or substantial government interest” and also “leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication.”  Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 
1997) (en banc) (quoting Mitchell v. Comm’n on Adult Entm’t Establishments, 10 F.3d 
123, 130 (3d Cir. 1993)).  In applying the “secondary effects” doctrine, we have required 
municipalities to “identify the justifying secondary effects with some particularity,” and 
“offer some record support for the existence of those effects and for the [o]rdinance’s 
amelioration thereof.”  Id. at 175.  But a municipality need not “conduct new studies or 
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produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as 
whatever evidence [it] relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem 
that [it] addresses.”  Renton, 475 U.S. at 51–52.   
Sutton argues that the Township failed to prove that the purpose of its restrictions 
on adult entertainment facilities was to combat their secondary effects.  But even viewing 
the record in the light most favorable to Sutton, we conclude otherwise –– there is no 
genuine dispute that the Township acted to address the secondary effects of adult 
entertainment facilities.  To be sure, as Sutton point outs, the evidence of the Township’s 
consideration of secondary effects is thin.  But the evidence is there.  The Township has 
produced sworn affidavits from multiple officials involved in passing the adult 
entertainment restrictions demonstrating that the “principal concerns” were with “orderly 
growth, traffic, health and safety, and crime.”  J.A. 156; see also J.A. 516–17; 1210.  And 
the Township has “offer[ed] some record support for the existence of those effects and 
for the [o]rdinance’s amelioration thereof.”  Phillips, 107 F.3d at 175.  The Township’s 
then-Chairman of the Board stated, under penalty of perjury, “that studies had been 
performed in other municipalities demonstrating a direct relationship between the 
presence of [adult] facilities and increases of crime and decreases in surrounding property 
values.”  J.A. 157.  Moreover, the Township’s then-Solicitor testified that he reviewed 
various court decisions, as well as legislative findings, discussing the negative secondary 
effects of adult entertainment businesses.  See J.A. 1051–53; see also 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
5501(a)(1) (“There are within this Commonwealth a number of adult-oriented 
establishments which require special regulation by law and supervision by public safety 
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agencies in order to protect and preserve the health, safety and welfare of patrons of these 
establishments, as well as the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of this 
Commonwealth.”).  And we have held that municipalities are entitled to rely on the 
legislative findings of their home state.  See Ben Rich Trading, Inc. v. City of Vineland, 
126 F.3d 155, 160–62 (3d Cir. 1997).  Sutton does not contest these findings.  In sum, the 
record demonstrates that the ordinance “was passed to control the socially undesirable 
effects incidental to the operation of adult entertainment establishments.”  Mitchell, 
10 F.3d at 137.  
The ordinance, accordingly, passes constitutional muster so long as it is “narrowly 
tailored” and “leave[s] open adequate alternative channels of communication.”  Id. at 
139.  That is the case here.  Indeed, Sutton offers no argument to the contrary beyond 
claiming that the Township did not identify with enough precision the secondary effects 
it sought to target.  But the Township did identify the concerns underlying its zoning 
ordinance –– “surrounding property values, crime, noise, and harmonious development 
with other uses.”  J.A. 157.  As the Supreme Court has stressed in this context, a 
municipality “must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to 
admittedly serious problems.”  Renton, 475 U.S. at 52 (quoting Young v. Am. Mini 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (plurality opinion)).  Sutton’s facial challenge fails. 
B. 
Sutton next argues that, even if the ordinance’s restrictions on adult entertainment 
facilities are facially valid, they were unconstitutional as applied.  In other words, he 
contends that the Board denied his application not for content-neutral reasons but 
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specifically “because of its content.”  Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 
(1972).  
This argument fails.  The record demonstrates that the Board rejected the 
application not out of animus to nude dancing but for legitimate, content-neutral reasons.  
For starters, the Board found that, under the ordinance, only “stores” could be part of a 
shopping center, and the cabaret was not a store.4  Perhaps most significantly, the Board 
found that Sutton failed to establish that the cabaret would meet the ground-water 
discharge and sewage-disposal requirements applicable to all special uses.  Sutton claims 
that he established compliance with the ground-water discharge requirements by 
explaining that the shopping center’s compliance had been approved when it was 
originally built and that the cabaret would not require more water than other prior uses 
there.  But Sutton admitted to the Board that he had not “conducted any water supply 
studies or engineering to indicate the current status of [the shopping center’s] water and 
whether that’s going to be changed” with the cabaret.  J.A. 937.  And Sutton even 
admitted that he did not “have any studies or testimony to provide to the Board” showing 
that his proposed use met the ordinance’s sewage-disposal requirements.  J.A. 938.  
There is thus no genuine dispute that Sutton failed to meet the ordinance’s ground-water 
discharge and sewage-disposal requirements.  That was a legitimate, content-neutral 
reason for the Board to reject his application.  
                                              
4 Sutton argues that this misreads the ordinance, pointing out that the shopping 
center at issue also contains a bank and a church, neither of which seemingly are a 
“store.”  But the Board noted that it had “never been asked to decide the appropriateness 
of any of the uses within the Shopping Center prior to this application.”  J.A. 959.  
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Finally, the Board found that the cabaret, by featuring lewd activity and permitting 
patrons to bring in alcohol, would violate Pennsylvania law.  Sutton claims that he would 
have changed the cabaret’s alcohol policy if necessary to comply with state law, but, 
ultimately, the application for the cabaret did include a provision permitting patrons to 
“bring their own beverages.”  J.A. 1199.  The Board cannot be faulted for evaluating the 
application on its stated terms.5 
In short, the Board articulated multiple permissible reasons for denying the 
application.  The record, therefore, does not support Sutton’s as-applied challenge.  
C. 
 Lastly, Sutton claims that the Township violated substantive due process when it 
rejected his application. 
We have long explained that “executive action violates substantive due process 
only when it shocks the conscience.”  United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of 
Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399–400 (3d Cir. 2003).  While “the meaning of this standard 
varies depending on the factual context,” id., it is “designed to avoid converting federal 
courts into super zoning tribunals,” Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  Thus, “only the most egregious official conduct” violates substantive due 
process.  Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).  
                                              
5 Sutton also argues that “the content of any adult materials or speech cannot 
constitute a nuisance,” citing Ranck v. Bonal Enters., Inc., 359 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1976).  
Sutton Br. 31.  But the Board did not find the cabaret to be a nuisance because of its 
obscenity; rather, it found that it would be a nuisance simply because of its illegality.  
And Sutton does not challenge here the underlying constitutionality of the Pennsylvania 
statute.  
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Sutton argues that the conduct here meets that standard.  He contends that the 
Township Solicitor, who wrote the final decision denying his application, did so without 
the approval of the Zoning Board members and purely out of animus toward nude 
dancing.  But Sutton assumes unconstitutional conduct that is unsubstantiated by the 
record, even when viewed in the light most favorable to him.  As discussed, the Board 
ultimately offered several permissible reasons for denying his application that had 
nothing to do with the morality or expressive nature of nude dancing.  We cannot 
conclude that such conduct “shocks the conscience.”  United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
